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This contribution seeks to shed new light onto the classification of legal orders with respect to 
the domestic effect of international law. Traditional theory distinguishes between monist and 
dualist systems, those that accept the primacy of international law over domestic law, and 
those that do not attribute direct effect to international law in the domestic legal order. We 
will examine three different lines of constitutional jurisprudence on the effect of decisions of 
international authorities in the domestic order. It is maintained that all courts dealing with 
the domestic effect of international secondary law ultimately face questions of legitimacy of the 
external decision-making procedure. We will identify three strategies to cope with this 
challenge and argue that it is more appropriate to consider the relationship of a national legal 
order to international law through the prism of how its constitutional court approaches the 
governance issue than to refer to the traditional monism-dualism-dichotomy. 
Introduction 
One of the big debates of international law scholarship of the last century centered on the 
relationship between international law and domestic law.
1 Today, there seems to be 
agreement that it is not possible to give one abstract, universal answer to the question. The 
effect of international law rather depends on how the conflict is solved by each domestic 
legal order.
2 However, the question has regained attention. Two recent decisions of 
constitutional courts have caused a great stir in legal scholarship. In its Medellín decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court had to deal with the effect of decisions of the International Court 
of Justice in the U.S. legal order.
3 Equally, the European Court of Justice had to decide in 
the Kadi judgment on whether Resolutions of the U.N. Security Council are absolutely 
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1    See the groundbreaking contributions of Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Leipzig: 
Hirschfeldt, 1899) (taking a dualistic position, according to which international law and domestic law are 
separate legal orders) and Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Tübingen: 
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Law’ (1992) 235 RdC 303, 317. 
3   Medellín v. Texas, 128 S Ct 1346 (2008).   2
binding for the European legislator.
4 Both courts came to the same result, rejecting the 
unconditional supremacy of international law. 
Although similar in their result, the courts followed, as we will see, different rationales in 
Medellín and Kadi, which cannot be captured by the traditional distinction. The reason is 
that there is a new dimension to the debate. Traditionally, the question of domestic effect 
of international law referred to the application of customary international law or treaties to 
which the concerned state was a party. The political institutions of the respective state thus 
had a direct influence on the creation of the norm that was later to be applied in its 
domestic courts. There have recently, however, been developments that blur this 
traditional picture. Increasingly, new institutions are evolving on the international plane, 
which take decisions without many of the affected states being involved in the decision-
making process.
5 They exercise public authority unilaterally.
6 This not only concerns 
administrative and legislative bodies, but also international courts and tribunals, which 
often play a pivotal role in deepening international integration. These forms of governance 
pose questions of legitimacy and thus represent new challenges to domestic courts that 
have to implement such international secondary law in the domestic legal order.
7 
The traditional monism/pluralism-divide assumes a hierarchy between competing legal 
orders.
8 Under monism, the international order always trumps domestic norms, while, 
under dualism, the domestic order determines the rank of international law in the domestic 
setting. This description may be accurate if we have static legal orders, but it is 
inappropriate for dynamic régimes, which are shaped by decisions of courts and 
international institutions. Therefore, while conceptualizing the relationship of courts with 
competing jurisdiction, some scholars have recently departed from the hierarchical 
description of legal systems. They perceive the relation of different courts rather as one of 
cooperation
9 or observe the emergence of a pluralistic order of jurisdictions.
10 
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This contribution seeks to identify factors that explain the attitude of constitutional courts 
vis-à-vis international institutions. In two prominent contributions, Eyal Benvenisti has 
recently argued that courts act strategically in the application of international law in the 
domestic order.
11 On the one hand, they try to shield domestic political branches from 
external pressure, on the other hand they want to ensure their own independence. In order 
to attain these goals, they often seek the cooperation with domestic courts from other legal 
systems and international tribunals. According to this reasoning, national courts thus often 
adhere to international decisions in order to establish “a united, coordinated judicial 
front.”
12 Benvenisti welcomes this development and argues that the cooperation of 
domestic courts in order to reduce the external pressures of globalization strengthens 
domestic democracy and increases the accountability of international regulatory 
institutions.
13 
Although we often observe instances of judicial cooperation, Benvenisti’s account only tells 
part of the story. With regard to the adherence of national courts to international court 
decisions, there is evidence that courts not always follow the international courts in order 
to establish a coordinated judicial front. Instead, constitutional courts take different 
approaches in dealing with the implementation of international decisions. These 
differences cannot exclusively be explained by strategic considerations. It will be argued 
that the readiness to accept the direct effect of international decisions equally depends on 
the perceived legitimacy of the international authority. These legitimacy deliberations 
interact in different ways with strategic considerations. It will be shown that constitutional 
courts apply three different concepts of legitimacy when dealing with the implementation 
of decisions of international authorities in the domestic legal system. 
In the following, I will first sketch the theoretical framework, highlighting that there are 
different standards for evaluating legitimacy. In order to exemplify the theoretical model, 
three lines of constitutional jurisprudence will be analyzed, each applying a different 
strategy for judging legitimacy. I will compare the jurisprudences of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the European Court of Justice and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. This analysis 
will show that the traditional accounts do not offer suitable explanations for the observed 
developments in constitutional jurisprudence. Therefore, a legitimacy-based categorization 
will be proposed, which should be more accurate in its explanations than the traditional 
monism-dualism-dichotomy. 
The exercise of international public authority and the problem of legitimacy 
The question of legitimacy is none that greatly concerns legal scholars in the domestic 
context. In democratic societies, we find an institutional setting that guarantees – through 
parliamentary legislation and judicial control – that the exercise of public authority is, in 
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general, legitimate. Legality can thus be considered as a presumption for legitimacy.
14 This 
presumption has a rationalizing function: Courts are relieved of the need to control every 
sovereign act on its legitimacy. Because the system is assumed to be legitimate as a whole, 
they can concentrate on the formal control of legality.
15 However, such a presumption 
cannot be made at the international level, where legal standards regarding legitimacy and 
the rule of law are not yet sufficiently developed.
16 Jurisprudence and legal scholarship thus 
cannot confine themselves to a formal control of the legality of international public 
authority.
17 They rather have to take considerations of legitimacy into account. However, 
legitimacy is a contested concept that is subject to many prominent debates in legal and 
political science scholarship. There are basically three strategies to cope with the challenge 
of legitimizing public authority in the international arena, which shall be sketched in more 
detail in the following.
18 
The state sovereignty paradigm and the illegitimacy of international authority 
The first strategy – we will call it the sovereignty paradigm – is to deny the legitimacy of 
international institutions at all.
19 According to this position, legitimacy is inextricably linked 
to democracy, and democracy can only be exercised within the nation state because it 
presupposes the existence of a demos. The underlying idea is that nation state democracy is 
the only form of state that best preserves individual freedom and self-determination. 
Political self-determination requires the belonging to a specific political community, which 
is most often the nation state. Decisions that are taken outside this polity cannot be 
legitimate because either its citizens have not participated at all in the decision, or the latter 
has at least decisively been influenced by non-citizens. Authority is, at least partly, exercised 
by foreign actors. Under this reading of democracy, state sovereignty is thus not only a 
concept to protect statehood, but also to preserve democracy and the self-rule of political 
communities. 
Every international decision-making procedure that does not require the consent of each 
individual state would consequently be illegitimate. Because of this illegitimacy, decisions of 
international institutions or international courts can never have a direct effect within the 
domestic legal order. They only become effective in the domestic sphere if they have been 
                                                 
14   Utz Schliesky, Souveränität und Legitimität von Herrschaftsgewalt (2004) 167. 
15   Matthias Goldmann, ‘Der Widerspenstigen Zähmung, oder: Netzwerke dogmatisch gedacht’ in Sigrid 
Boysen et al. (eds) Netzwerke (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007) 225, 234. 
16   See Mattias Kumm, ‘Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of 
Engagement’ in Sujit Choudhry (ed) The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 256, 261-62 (emphasizing that the presumption in favor of compliance with international law can 
be rebutted if international law violates jurisdictional, procedural or outcome-related principles). 
17   Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, n 6 above, 1389. 
18  This classification is inspired by the account of Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Globalization and Europe: 
How to Square Democracy, Globalization, and International Law’ (2004) 15 EJIL 885, 895-904. 
19   See, e.g., Prosper Weil, ‘Vers une normativité relative en droit international?’ (1982) 86 Revue générale de 
droit international public 5; Josef Isensee, ‘Abschied der Demokratie vom Demos - Ausländerwahlrecht als 
Identitätsfrage für Volk, Demokratie und Verfassung’ in Dieter Schwab, Dieter Giesen & Joseph Listl (eds) 
Staat, Kirche, Wissenschaft in einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Paul Mikat zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1989) 705; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, ‘The Current Illegitimacy of 
International Human Rights Litigation’ (1997) 66 Fordham L Rev 319; Paul B. Stephan, ‘International 
Governance and American Democracy’ (2000) 1 Chicago JIL 237; Roger P. Alford, ‘Misusing International 
Sources to Interpret the Constitution’ (2004) 98 AJIL 57.   5
transformed into domestic law by the competent political institutions of the legislature or 
the executive. Through the formal act of transformation, the national institutions acquiesce 
to the decision of the international institution and legitimize their application by domestic 
courts. 
The internationalist paradigm and the focus on international procedures 
The opposite conception is the internationalist paradigm.
20 The internationalists do not 
focus on the nation state. Rather, they examine the legitimacy of the international decision-
making procedures on the basis of their proper architecture. In contrast to the sovereignty 
paradigm, the authority is not legitimate or illegitimate merely because of having been 
exercised by an international institution. In the domestic context, legitimacy concepts are 
often input-oriented and focus on whether citizens have at least indirectly participated in 
the political decision-making process. However, scholars adhering to the internationalist 
paradigm claim that it is impossible to apply domestic legitimacy standards to the 
international arena without modifications.
21 Therefore, factors have to be identified that 
disassociate legitimacy from the nation state demos.
22 Instead of focusing on participation, 
internationalists often try to identify factors that control the output of the political 
decision-making process.
23 They do, therefore, not primarily focus on whether the affected 
citizens have – indirectly – participated in the political process, but whether the design of 
the decision-making procedures allows us to expect the decisions to meet certain 
qualitative standards.
24 
From an output-oriented perspective, political decisions bear two major risks:
25 On the one 
hand, political actors or public officials may misuse their power and act in their private and 
not in the public interest; on the other hand, the substantive quality of the decisions may be 
insufficient because the officials are either incompetent or lack the necessary information. 
The danger that political agents may misuse their power occurs if the private and the public 
interest diverge, and the agents do not have incentives to act for the benefit of the 
common good. The principal mechanism to align the incentives with the public interest is 
holding political actors accountable.
26 Within nation states, accountability is primarily 
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achieved through elections and a hierarchical organization of the bureaucracy.
27 Political 
actors who don’t act in the public interest have to fear that they are not reelected, and the 
actions of public officials in the executive are controlled by their superiors. 
As there are no elections in the inter- or supranational arena, this model cannot easily be 
transferred to international decision-making processes.
28 However, there are alternative 
ways of shaping the incentives of political agents in the international context. 
Accountability has basically two requirements: first, it is necessary to obtain information 
about a potential misuse of power, and, second, there has to be a capacity to sanction the 
office holder if a misuse has occurred.
29 Mechanisms ensuring the provision of information 
are the transparency of the decision-making process or the requirement to justify decisions 
by giving reasons.
30 
With regard to possible sanctions, losing the political office is a rigorous form of 
sanctioning the misuse of power, but there are other, less severe means that may ensure 
accountability.
31 These include formal measures like disciplinary actions or informal ones, 
such as reputational sanctions. In the context of international organizations or international 
regulatory bodies, the formal measures may be exercised by supervisors or the member 
states. Reputational sanctions require a certain level of transparency and involve naming 
and shaming by the media or the general public. Accountability is thus a gradual concept 
that does not only allow either-or-judgments, but comes in different shades and degrees. 
Even if some mechanisms, such as elections, are not available on the international level, 
this does not mean that international actors cannot be held accountable to a certain degree. 
The second element of output legitimacy, the quality of political decisions, can be 
understood in substantive as well as in procedural terms. With regard to substantive 
standards, it is difficult to formulate political standards for political decisions in advance. 
However, certain standards are derived from legal norms,
32 which constitute the outer 
limits of political decisions. These norms include in particular the respect of the 
fundamental human rights and the principle of proportionality.
33 Concerning the 
procedure, there is a controversial debate in political theory on whether it is possible to 
formulate any qualitative standards for political decisions that go beyond the requirement 
of accountability.
34 However, this debate has so far barely resonated with the scholarship in 
international law and international relations. 
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What is discussed in the legal literature are more modest procedural safeguards, such as 
effective legal remedies in order to ensure compliance with the legal norms or an obligation 
to hear individuals affected by decisions of international bodies in order to ameliorate the 
informational basis on which these decisions are taken.
35 These procedural safeguards can 
work in both directions: on the one hand, they can ensure the accountability of 
international decision-making processes, but on the other hand, they can also enhance the 
quality of the actual decisions. 
Consequently, a court adhering to the internationalist paradigm examines the decision-
making procedure of an international institution in order to decide whether it attributes 
direct effect to it. Executive and legislative decisions can typically be regarded as legitimate 
if their adoption process contains certain procedural safeguards that ensure the 
accountability of the decision-makers and a certain substantive quality of the decisions. In 
judicial decisions, accountability is difficult to achieve, as the independence of judges is 
often seen as a crucial element of adjudication. Therefore, domestic courts additionally 
apply a substantive standard, reviewing whether the jurisprudence of the international court 
does, in general, conform with the fundamental values of the domestic society, which are 
contained in the domestic constitution. A decision of an international court is attributed 
direct effect if its jurisprudence as a whole is considered as legitimate without every 
individual decision being substantively reviewed. 
The cooperation paradigm and the chain of legitimization 
In between these two positions, we find the cooperation paradigm.
36 The cooperation 
paradigm shares with the sovereignty-centered approach that the nation states remain the 
central building blocks of the international legal order. The national citizenry is the ultimate 
source of legitimacy, and thus every political decision has, to a certain extent, to be 
attributable to the electorate of the nation state.
37 The emergence of authority beyond the 
nation state is not excluded per se, but the evaluation of international authority is based on 
different criteria than under the internationalist paradigm. While the latter is concerned 
with the concrete design of international decision-making procedures and primarily 
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evaluates them according to their expected output, the cooperation paradigm focuses on 
the share of (indirect) participation by the national citizens. 
The exercise of authority is legitimate if it can be attributed to the citizenry by formal 
chains of attribution.
38 International decisions can be attributed to the national demos in two 
ways: On the one hand, it is derived by an effective parliamentary control of the acts that 
delegate sovereign authority to supranational entities and the participation of legitimate 
representatives of the state in the international decision-making procedures. According to 
this understanding of legitimacy, supranational legislation, e.g. in the context of the 
European Union, is legitimate to the extent that either the national government or elected 
representatives of the nation state had a vote in the decision-making process.
39 
However, the concept of the formal chain of attribution only works for political decisions, 
but cannot be conferred to decisions of international courts and tribunals because judicial 
decisions usually do not derive their legitimacy from the indirect participation of citizens. 
National courts rather exercise a substantive review of each individual judgment of 
international courts, in which they assess whether the decision conforms to the 
fundamental values of the domestic society, which are expressed by the national 
constitution. 
This approach differs both from the sovereignty and the internationalist paradigm. Under 
the sovereignty paradigm, a court would not accept the direct effect of a court judgment, 
unless it had been explicitly endorsed by the legislature. In contrast, a court adhering to the 
internationalist perspective would not make a substantive review of each individual 
judgment of an international court. Instead, it would take a broader approach and assess 
whether the jurisprudence conforms with the fundamental values of the domestic society 
in general. 
Three case studies on the perception of legitimacy by domestic courts 
In this section, we will try to evaluate three lines of constitutional jurisprudence according 
to the outlined theoretical classification. While the U.S. Supreme Court adheres to the 
sovereignty paradigm and insists on the positive implementation of international decisions 
by the national legislature, the approach of the European Court of Justice evaluates the 
design and the output of the international institutions themselves. The position of the 
German  Bundesverfassungsgericht is in between these two perspectives. Although still 
performing a substantive examination of the exercise of international public authority, the 
Constitutional Court does not necessarily require such decisions to be implemented by the 
German legislature. 
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The state sovereignty paradigm – the U.S. Supreme Court and its judgments in 
Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas 
There are numerous decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that deal with the effect of 
international treaties in U.S. domestic law.
40 However, there are only very few instances, in 
which the court had to deal with the domestic effect of decisions of international 
institutions. All of these concern judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
This section will focus on the two leading decisions in this respect. While, in Sanchez-Llamas 
v. Oregon, the Supreme Court had to deal with the authoritative effect of ICJ judgments 
when interpreting international legal norms,
41 the decision in Medellín v. Texas
42 was even 
more far-reaching. For the first time, the Court had to decide on the direct effect of an ICJ 
judgment to which the United States had been party and which was therefore legally 
binding for the U.S. In principle, the American Constitution establishes a monist concept 
with respect to international treaty norms in the domestic legal order. According to Art. VI 
para. 2, 
“all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” 
However, the principle of direct effect has been narrowed early by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In Foster & Elam v. Neilson, the Court made a distinction between self-executing treaties 
having a direct effect in domestic law and non-self-executing treaties that are addressed to 
the political, not the judicial, institutions.
43 The latter type has to be transformed into 
domestic law before they can be applied by the courts.  
Subject of both decisions was a violation of Art. 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations.
44 According to Art. 36 (1) lit. b of the Convention, arrested foreign nationals 
have to be informed that they have the right to notify the consular representation of their 
country of their arrest. In the course of this decade the United States had been convicted 
twice because of violations of this provision by the ICJ.
45 In Sanchez-Llamas, one of the 
applicants relied on the interpretation of Art. 36 (1) of the Vienna Convention in the two 
ICJ judgments in order to make a claim regarding U.S. domestic law. In Medellín, the 
applicant was one of the individuals for whom Mexico had exercised diplomatic protection 
in the Avena case so that the ICJ judgment was directly legally binding for the U.S. 
The decision in Sanchez-Llamas 
In  Sanchez-Llamas, one of the applicants, Mario Bustillo from Honduras, had been 
convicted of first-degree murder. After the conviction had been confirmed on appeal and 
had become final, Bustillo filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a state court. There, 
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for the first time, he argued that the American authorities had violated Art. 36 VCCR as 
they had not informed him about his right to contact the Honduran Consulate. With the 
help of the Consulate, it would have been much easier for him to prove his innocence 
during the criminal proceedings. The state habeas court dismissed Bustillo’s claim as 
procedurally barred. He would have had to raise his claim based on the Vienna Convention 
before the conviction became final. 
Applying to the U.S. Supreme Court, Bustillo argued that the application of this procedural 
default rule by the Virginia courts violated Art. 36 VCCR. In an earlier judgment, Breard v. 
Greene, the U.S. Supreme Court had already decided that a violation of Art. 36 VCCR did 
not bar the application of the procedural default rule.
46 If the claim had not been raised in 
the state court proceedings, Art. 36 VCCR did not require states to modify their criminal 
procedure law.
47 Bustillo argued that Breard was not applicable to his case because there had 
been two judgments of the International Court of Justice in the meantime,
48 according to 
which the cure of a violation of the Vienna Convention must not be rendered impossible 
by procedural default rules. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected this argumentation. The interpretation of 
American domestic law is a task of American courts. Determining the domestic effect of an 
international treaty, is a matter of domestic law.
49 Thus, the judgments of the ICJ have no 
directly binding force. They deserve, at best, “respectful consideration”.
 50 However, the ICJ 
judgments do not take into account the importance of procedural default rules in an 
adversary system. While, in inquisitorial systems, mistakes are attributed to the judges, they 
fall into the responsibility of the parties in adversary systems. If Art. 36 VCCR was 
interpreted in a way that the application of the procedural default rule was excluded, this 
interpretation 
“reads the ‚full effect’ proviso in a way that leaves little room for Article 36’s clear instruction 
that Art. 36 rights ‚shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the 
receiving state.’”51 
Therefore, the interpretation of the ICJ could not be taken into account in the case of 
Mario Bustillo. 
The Medellín decision 
The judgment in Sanchez-Llamas paved the way for the Medellín decision, which was issued 
two years later. The applicant in Medellín had been sentenced to death because of murder 
and joint rape. After his conviction, he filed a habeas corpus petition and claimed that he had 
not been informed of his rights under Art. 36 (1) lit. b of the Vienna Convention. During 
the habeas proceedings, the ICJ issued the Avena decision, in which the Court found that 
the United States had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Medellín had 
been one of the 51 Mexican nationals for whom Mexico had filed the procedure before the 
ICJ. In its decision the Court asked the United States 
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“[to] provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the conviction and 
sentence, so as to allow full weight to be given to the violation of the rights set forth in the 
Convention.”52 
As Medellín was among the beneficiaries of Mexico’s application, the judgment was 
binding for his proceedings in terms of international law. After the rendition of the 
judgment, President George W. Bush issued an executive order in which he asked the 
American courts to give effect to the ICJ decision: 
“I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and 
the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will discharge its international 
obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in [Avena], by having State 
courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed 
by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.”53 
Despite the ICJ judgment and the memorandum of George Bush, the Fifth Circuit rejected 
the habeas application of Medellín.
54 In his proceedings before the Supreme Court, the 
applicant hence claimed that the Fifth Circuit had violated the Supremacy Clause of the 
American Constitution. In its decision the Court had therefore to decide whether 
judgments of the International Court of Justice have direct domestic effect. The central 
international norm in this respect is Art. 94 (1) of the U.N. Charter
55 according to which 
“[e]ach member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is party.” 
On the face, the Supreme Court based his decision on the text of the U.N. Charter. The 
terms “undertakes to comply” emphasizes, in the opinion of the Court, that a state only 
enters into an obligation to react on a judgment by political means.
56 This interpretation is 
supposed to be supported by the context of the norm. Art. 94 (2) of the U.N. Charter 
provides a political and no legal remedy: If states do not comply with an ICJ judgment, 
they have to refer to the U.N. Security Council.
57 
In substance however, the judgment is motivated by considerations stemming from 
constitutional theory, or, more precisely, the doctrine of the division of powers. As the 
field of external relations is very sensitive, decisions on the implementation of international 
law should be left to the political, not the judicial, organs.
58 The Court underlines that “it is 
not for the federal courts to impose one [particular remedy] on the States through 
lawmaking of their own.”
59 This judicial self-restraint can be interpreted in a twofold way. One 
might be inclined to read the reasoning of the court from an ex ante perspective according 
to which it is the function of the courts to abide by the law. The courts have to implement 
the intent of the political bodies, and this approach can best be implemented by a close 
adherence to the text of the norm created by the political institutions. 
However, such an approach has several flaws. Linguistic expressions do not have only one 
single meaning. Their interpretation always depends on the interpreter and his cultural and 
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social imprint.
60 This is highlighted by Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Medellín that 
consults dictionary definitions and refers to the Spanish version of the U.N. Charter in 
order to show that the terms “undertakes to comply” employed by Art. 94 can also express 
an immediate legal obligation.
61 Furthermore, it is particularly unrealistic in the realm of 
international treaties to expect the text to say anything about the domestic effect of the 
treaty.
62 The implementation of international norms differs from state to state. The 
differentiation between self-executing and non-self-executing is only significant from the 
view-point of the domestic legal order, but not from the angle of international law, as the 
latter demands unconditional compliance anyway.
63 
Medellín has thus to be read as a proposition of an ex post control model. According to this 
model, decisions of international institutions with domestic effect are subject to political 
control. The Supreme Court emphasizes that it is not the task of the judiciary to exercise 
such control.
64 Furthermore, the Court holds that the president did not have the power to 
order an implementation of the judgment by means of an executive memorandum.
65 The 
implementation of the decision of an international tribunal thus requires a positive act of 
the U.S. Congress or state legislature, which have full political control over how to 
implement the decision in question.
66 Consequently, international decisions cannot have 
any direct effect in the US legal order unless they have been positively embraced by the 
legislature so that all political decisions have finally to be made within the arena of the 
nation state. The U.S. Supreme Court therefore implicitly adheres to the state sovereignty 
paradigm. 
The internationalist paradigm – the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
The opposite approach is represented by the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice. To be sure, the European Union is not a state and the ECJ thus not a constitutional 
court in the statist sense of the notion. However, the problem of attributing direct effect to 
law that originated in a distinct legal order, is not exclusively a problem of domestic law. In 
recent decades, some supranational legal orders have developed, in which the process of 
law creation differs considerably from the traditional sources doctrine of international law. 
The most notable example in this respect is the European Union, whose legal order has 
developed into a constitutional order, showcasing all relevant characteristics of such a 
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system.
67 Its law-making process is closer to legislation within nation-states than to the 
diplomatic, consensus-oriented bargaining in the international arena so that the 
coordination with the international legal order poses similar problems as in domestic law.
68 
In several instances, the ECJ had to decide on the status of international law in the EU 
legal order. In its decisions the ECJ primarily adopts an internationalist standpoint. In the 
following, this shall be highlighted by focusing on three different strands of the ECJ 
jurisprudence. First, there is a considerable amount of judgments dealing with the 
importance of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights for the interpretation of 
human rights within the EU legal system. Second, the ECJ has, over a series of decisions, 
developed a standpoint on the direct effect of decisions of the WTO dispute settlement 
system within the EU order. Finally, the recent Kadi decision
69 of the ECJ had to answer 
the question, whether it is possible to review acts transforming resolutions of the UN 
Security Council with regard to principles forming part of the European constitutional 
order. 
Interpretation of human rights and the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
The relationship of the ECJ to human rights has not always been an easy one. In first years 
of the European integration, the ECJ did not refer to human rights at all. There seemed to 
be no need in this respect, as the founding treaties of the European Communities did not 
contain an explicit human rights catalogue. However, the Court quickly realized that it had 
to take into account the individual rights dimension of the cases brought before it, if it 
wanted to ensure the acceptance of its jurisprudence by the courts of the Member States.
70 
It thus started to develop a human rights jurisprudence, which has been acknowledged by 
Art. 6 (3) of the EU Treaty
71, which requires the EU institutions to respect fundamental 
rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the common traditions of the 
Member States. However, as the European Union did, until very recently, not have a legally 
binding human rights catalogue,
72 the ECJ always had to ‘import’ human rights from other 
legal systems. In practice, the ECJ principally refers to the provisions of the European 
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Convention on Human Rights
73 as expressions of the common traditions of the EU 
Member States. 
The institution mandated with the coherent interpretation of the Convention is the 
European Court of Human Rights, though, not the ECJ. Therefore, there has been much 
debate on whether the ECJ has to take the jurisprudence of the ECtHR into account when 
applying the rights of the Convention in the context of the EU.
74 Although the European 
Union is not formally bound by the Convention, there would be potential for serious 
conflict if the ECJ interpreted its guarantees in a different way than the ECtHR. 
The ECJ has never expressly clarified its relationship to the ECtHR and whether it feels 
bound by the latter’s jurisprudence.
75 However, it has implicitly recognized the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as authoritative. When interpreting provisions of the ECHR, the Luxemburg 
Court frequently refers to and cites judgments of the ECtHR.
76 In Schmidberger, e.g., the 
ECJ cites the ECtHR for the statement that the freedom of expression and the freedom of 
assembly are no absolute guarantees under the ECHR, but that they may be subject to 
restrictions.
77 In RTL Television, the Court referred to the margin of appreciation doctrine of 
the ECtHR in order to justify a restriction of Art. 10 ECHR.
78 
There are no examples in which the ECJ openly opposed a decision from Strasbourg.
79 
Even if Luxemburg did not follow Strasbourg, it was rather because it had probably 
overlooked that there is Strasbourg case law in this respect than because of disagreement.
80 
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The ECJ has even changed its own jurisprudence in several occasions if the ECtHR took a 
different position on issues that had already been decided by the ECJ.
81 In Hoechst, e.g., the 
ECJ found that there was no case law of the ECtHR on the inviolability of business 
premises and held that the right to privacy established by Art. 8 ECHR did not apply to 
businesses.
82 When the ECtHR extended the protection of Art. 8 ECHR to businesses in a 
later judgment,
83 the ECJ changed its jurisprudence in Roquette Frères and acknowledged that 
business premises could also be protected under Art. 8 ECHR.
84 
This strategy of the ECJ vis-à-vis the jurisprudence of the ECtHR fits into the patterns of 
the internationalist paradigm. By frequently citing the ECtHR and adopting its standards, 
the ECJ basically accepts Strasbourg’s human rights jurisprudence. As the ECJ does not 
explicitly discuss the status of the ECtHR jurisprudence in EU law, it is possible to come 
up with different explanations for this observation. One might be inclined to argue that the 
reasons are of purely strategic nature assuming that Luxemburg wants to avoid any conflict 
with Strasbourg. However, the ECJ does not shy away from conflicts with other judicial 
organs, such as the WTO Appellate Body,
85 so that there has to be at least an additional 
explanation for the conduct of the ECJ. One way of interpreting this conduct is that the 
Court implicitly regards the judgments of the ECtHR as legitimate. The standard of 
assessment would be a substantive one – human rights, or, more precisely, the particular 
human rights understanding of the ECJ. This would also explain why the ECJ has not yet 
taken a clear stance on this issue and expressly accepted the unconditional supremacy of 
the ECtHR. As there is no guarantee that the substance of the ECtHR jurisprudence may 
not vary, it formally reserves itself the right to deviate if circumstances should change and 
major disagreements arise. 
WTO dispute settlement and the lacking constitutional order 
The direct effect of World Trade law in the EU legal order has been subject to much 
debate in legal scholarship. Many authors have seen parallels to the integration process 
within the European Communities and thus claimed that the ECJ should give direct effect 
to World Trade law in the same way as it requires the EU member states to give direct 
effect to legal norms of the EU order.
86 The ECJ has, however, been reluctant in this 
respect. Even before the establishment of the WTO, it held that provisions of the General 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
87 do not have direct effect in the community legal order.
88 
It affirmed this line of jurisprudence also for the context of the WTO,
89 and extended this 
rationale to decisions of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
In  Biret International,
90 the ECJ had to decide whether a French company could claim 
compensation for damages from the Community for violating the SPS Agreement
91. In 
1988 and 1996, the Council adopted directives 88/146/EEC
92 and 96/22/EC
93 prohibiting 
the importation of meat of animals treated with certain hormones. In January 1998, the 
Appellate body of the WTO found that these directives were in breach of the SPS 
Agreement.
94 The plaintiff, Biret International, thus claimed that the European Community 
was liable under the EC treaty because it had violated WTO law. However, the ECJ left 
open, whether the Appellate body decision has a direct effect in the Community legal 
order. As the Community had a certain time frame in which to implement the Appellate 
body decision, the ECJ held that a claim for damages could not arise before the expiration 
of this period.
95 Damages for the time after the expiration of the implementation period 
had not been asserted by the plaintiff.
96 
In the Van Parys judgment, the ECJ went one step further and held that decisions of the 
WTO dispute settlement system did not have a direct effect in the EU legal order.
97 The 
case refers to the banana import system established by the EC, which differentiates 
between bananas imported from ACP States and those imported from non-ACP third 
states. In 1997, the WTO Appellate Body found that this system was incompatible with 
certain provisions of the GATT.
98 In 1998 and 1999, the plaintiff applied for import 
licences for bananas from Ecuador. The Belgian authorities, due to respective EC 
regulations, only granted a certain quota of the applied quantities. Van Parys took legal 
actions against these decisions, and claimed that they should not be based on the EC 
regulations, as the latter were incompatible with WTO law. 
In its decision, the ECJ refers to its established jurisprudence that World Trade law has no 
direct effect in the EU legal order, and that DSB decisions could therefore not have such 
an effect either.
99 The Court principally puts forward two arguments: first, it underlines that 
the WTO dispute settlement system is not a fully developed judicial system, but that it 
accords considerable importance to negotiation between the parties – even after a DSB 
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decision has been issued.
100 If DSB decisions had direct effect, this would deprive the 
political organs of the EU of their room for negotiation afforded by the procedural 
provisions of the DSB.
101 Second, the WTO system is built upon the principle of 
reciprocity. There are some member states of the WTO which deny World Trade law 
direct effect within their domestic legal order so that it would again deprive the political 
organs of the EU of considerable room for manoeuvre.
102 
In IKEA, the plaintiff relied on a decision of the WTO Appellate Body
103 in order to claim 
that regulation 2398/97
104 was invalid because it violated the Anti-Dumping Agreement
105 
of the WTO.
106 IKEA thus requested the competent British customs authority to 
reimburse the anti-dumping duties that it had paid under the contested regulation. The 
ECJ, however, rejected the request. It argued that WTO dispute settlement decisions had 
only prospective and no retroactive effect. Furthermore, the Community had made it clear 
by the regulations subsequent to regulation 2398/97 that it intended to exclude 
repayments. Because of a political will to the contrary, the ECJ could thus not grant 
repayments to IKEA despite the illegality of regulation 2398/97 under World Trade law. 
In the FIAMM judgment, the plaintiffs claimed damages for losses incurred under trade 
sanctions.
107 These sanctions had been imposed by the United States because of non-
compliance of the European Union with the Appellate Body decision in the banana 
litigation. In its decision, the ECJ repeated its argument that the direct effect of Appellate 
Body decisions would deprive the Community’s executive and legislative organs of the 
necessary scope for manoeuvre.
108 This is even the case if the time for implementing the 
decision has expired.
109 The Court further argues that there cannot be different 
considerations if the action is for compensation instead of annulment.
110 Therefore, it 
dismissed the claim of the plaintiffs. 
Considered in isolation, the ECJ jurisprudence vis-à-vis the effect of WTO in the 
community legal order resembles the discussed judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court. As 
the latter, the ECJ relies on the will of the political institutions and thus denies any direct 
effect of decisions of the WTO dispute settlement system. However, there are significant 
differences. While the U.S. Supreme Court is reluctant to accept the direct effect of 
decisions of international institutions in general, the ECJ always stresses the particularity of 
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the WTO dispute settlement.
111 These concern especially the political nature of the world 
trade system and the resulting importance of the principle of reciprocity. 
The Court thus seems to fear that the European Union would be at a disadvantage 
compared to the United States if decisions of the WTO Appellate Body had direct effect in 
EU law. This would make trade law more effective within the European legal order and 
thus deprive the Commission of a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the US and other 
members of the WTO. Unlike the US Supreme Court in Medellín, which explicitly mentions 
legitimacy concerns, the jurisprudence of ECJ is clearly driven by strategic considerations. 
Even if there might be legitimacy concerns,
112 these are not explicitly mentioned by the 
ECJ. The WTO jurisprudence of the ECJ is thus an illustration that legitimacy is not the 
only concern of courts dealing with decisions of international institutions. In some cases, 
legitimacy considerations may rather be overridden by strategic concerns. 
The U.N. Security Council and the Kadi decision 
In a recent decision, Kadi v. Council and Commission, the ECJ had to decide about the effect 
of resolutions of the UN Security Council in the EU legal order. The constellation in Kadi 
is slightly different than the ones discussed before. While the ECJ usually has to decide 
whether decisions of an international authority have an immediate effect in domestic law 
without any further implementation by the legislature, the ECJ had to decide whether a 
positive act of the European legislature was immune against constitutional review because 
it had been determined by a decision of an international institution. The European Union 
had issued a Council regulation in order to implement a resolution of the U.N. Security 
Council within the European Union. However, in order to decide whether EU law that is 
predetermined by international obligations can be subject to judicial review, the ECJ still 
had to determine the effect of international law within the Community legal order. Namely, 
it had to judge whether the Security Council decision was superior to EU primary law. 
The starting point of the case was a resolution of the U.N. Security Council directed 
against terrorism and specifically against Al-Qaida. After the attack on the U.S. embassies 
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, the Security Council issued Resolution 1267 
requesting all states to freeze all funds and other financial resources directly belonging or 
otherwise related to the Taliban.
113 The resolution also established a Sanctions Committee 
in order to manage these sanctions. One year later, Resolution 1333 authorized the 
Sanctions Committee to maintain an updated list of individuals and organizations 
designated as associated with the Taliban.
114 In order to implement these resolutions into 
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EU law, the Council issued Regulation 881/2002, which ordered the freezing of the funds 
of all persons contained on the list of the U.N. Sanctions Committee.
115 The listed 
individuals did not have an opportunity for an independent review of their status. 
The applicants, who were contained in the mentioned list, brought an action of annulment 
of the EC regulation to the European Court of First Instance (CFI). They argued, in 
particular, that the regulation violated their fundamental rights. The CFI, however, 
dismissed the actions.
116 It held that United Nations law had supremacy over EU law and 
that Security Council resolutions could thus not be reviewed under European 
constitutional law. The only legal standard for the control of Security Council resolutions 
was international ius cogens. The Court found, however, that the measures enacted by the 
Security Council resolution did not violate ius cogens. 
In the appeal procedure, the ECJ rejects this argumentation. It holds that even those 
legislative acts of the European Union that are predetermined by international law have to 
be subject to review under the constitutional principles of the EU. The Court establishes 
that the values enshrined in Art. 6 (1) of the pre-Lisbon version of the Treaty on European 
Union
117 – liberty, democracy and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
– are the foundation of the European Union, from which no derogation is possible.
118 
United Nations law can thus only have primacy over secondary Community law, but that 
primacy cannot extend to the constitutional provisions, in particular the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Union.
119 
The ECJ continues to examine whether the listing procedure of the U.N. Sanctions 
Committee had violated fundamental rights, in particular the right to defense, the right to 
an effective judicial review and the right to property. The rights to defense and judicial 
review contain, in particular, a right to be informed about the reasons for the imposition of 
the measure in question.
120 As the applicants had not been informed about the reasons for 
their inclusion in the list of the U.N. Sanctions Committee, these guarantees were 
violated.
121 With regard to the right to property, the Court holds that the freezing of funds 
and other economic resources could not be regarded as inappropriate per se in order to fight 
against persons connected to terrorism.
122 However, the confiscation of property has to 
include certain procedural guarantees. As the contested regulation did not furnish any 
guarantee enabling the applicants to put their case to the competent authorities, the ECJ 
considered the right to property to be violated.
123 
In the Kadi decision, the ECJ does not review an individual decision to impose a sanction 
against a specific individual, but the whole sanctioning system established by the Security 
Council as such. In evaluating this system, the Court adopts an internationalist 
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perspective.
124 Unlike the sovereignty and the cooperation paradigm, which derive the 
legitimacy of international decision-making to a certain extent from the participation of 
domestic authorities, internationalists focus on the procedural guarantees of the 
international decision-making process.
125 And here the ECJ finds certain fundamental 
flaws. The EC regulation was annulled because the procedure before the sanctions 
committee did not respect certain procedural rights that are supposed to enhance the 
accountability and the quality of the committee’s decisions. The persons who were listed by 
the UN Sanctions Committee were neither heard before the decision was taken nor given 
reasons for their treatment nor did they have an effective legal remedy.
126 Certainly the 
standards of evaluation are neither some abstract legitimacy considerations nor originating 
in international documents, but EU fundamental rights.
127 However, as courts are judicial 
bodies, they have to express legitimacy considerations in legal terms in order not to 
undermine their own legitimacy.
128 At the same time, the procedural rights examined by the 
ECJ are not specific to the EU context, but are often also discussed in the framework of 
general legitimacy concepts.
129 
Finally, the Court does not exclude to reduce the extent of its own judicial review if an 
appropriate review mechanism were installed on the international level. In the proceedings, 
the Commission had argued that the ECJ must not exercise judicial review as long as the 
individuals concerned have an acceptable opportunity of independent review forming part 
of the United Nations system. The Court does not reject this argument in principle, but 
only on factual grounds, as adequate judicial protection is not guaranteed.
130 Immunity is 
not unjustified per se. Instead, the ECJ deemed it unjustified “for clearly that re-examination 
procedure does not offer the guarantees of judicial protection.”
131 The Court thus indicates 
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that it would not interfere with the substantial considerations of concrete decisions of the 
UN Sanctions Committee if a legitimate procedure were put in place.
132 This shows that the 
court does not want to retain the complete substantive control of the decisions of the 
Committee, as would be characteristic for the cooperation paradigm. Instead, it only wants 
to ensure the general legitimacy of the decision-making procedure. 
Evaluation 
The case law of the ECJ on the effect of decisions of international authority within the EU 
legal system is not entirely homogenous. While the Court basically accepts the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR when interpreting the guarantees of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, it does not concede direct effect to decisions of the WTO 
dispute settlement body as well as to resolutions of the UN Security Council. Contrary to 
the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, this is, however, not a rejection of a direct 
effect of international ‘secondary’ law per se. The Court attributes the reason for not 
granting direct effect to the character of the specific régime. In Kadi, the Court is clearly 
driven by legitimacy concerns when it makes the resolution of the Security Council subject 
to judicial review under EU primary law. The WTO decisions are, in principle, motivated 
by political considerations. Here, legitimacy considerations are pushed aside because of 
strategic concerns, as the ECJ fears that the European institutions might have a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis other WTO members if decisions of the Appellate Body were 
granted direct effect. 
With the exception of the WTO jurisprudence, the Court thus adopts an internationalist 
perspective. It neither accepts unconditional direct effect of international decisions, nor 
does it reject direct effect per se. The legitimacy standards applied by the court take into 
account the concrete design of the respective institution and focus on its output. In its 
human rights jurisprudence, the court follows the decisions of the ECtHR because the 
history of the jurisprudence suggests that the judgments are, in principle, acceptable in their 
substance; in Kadi, the court intervened because the listing procedure did not respect 
certain procedural guarantees necessary to ensure legitimate decisions. 
The cooperation paradigm – the jurisprudence of the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht 
The jurisprudence of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht can be situated somewhere in 
between the two strategies highlighted so far. When analyzing the decisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, two strands have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the 
jurisprudence on the relationship to the European Union and the European Court of 
Justice, which is characterized by the special nature and the high degree of integration of 
the EU legal order. In this respect, the Constitutional Court basically accepts the 
supremacy of secondary community law and generally recognizes that the European Court 
of Justice has the exclusive right to review the legality of all acts of EU institutions. On the 
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other hand, there is a different strand of judgments concerning the direct effect of 
decisions of other international courts and tribunals. Two recent judgments concerning 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice 
show that the Bundesverfassungsgericht is much more reluctant in this respect. 
The jurisprudence in the context of the European Union 
The relationship between the European Court of Justice and the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has not been free of tension. While the ECJ has always claimed that 
all community law should have direct effect in national legal orders,
133 the Federal 
Constitutional Court has never accepted the unconditional supremacy of EU law. 
However, after reserving itself the right to full constitutional review of acts of community 
organs in the beginning,
134 the German Court has developed an equal protection doctrine, 
according to which it only guards the legitimacy of the system as a whole, but does not 
control for the constitutionality of each individual act. 
This conditional supremacy of community law has two dimensions. In principle, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht accepts that political decisions of the EU institutions, in particular 
EU secondary legislation, are superior to domestic law. In its Maastricht decision, the Court 
pointed out that delegating ultimate decision-making authority to the European Union did 
not infringe upon the democracy principle contained in the German constitution.
135 In its 
reasoning the Court followed the cooperation paradigm. It did not examine whether the 
institutional design of the European Union was legitimate per se. It rather derived the 
legitimacy via a formal chain of legitimization retraceable to the German ‘people’.
136 The 
EU was considered legitimate because the German citizens could indirectly influence the 
EU decision-making process through two channels. On the one hand, they were able to 
elect a significant number of the members of the European Parliament, and, on the other 
hand, they could elect the German Government, which takes part in the decision-making 
process in the Council.
137 
This jurisprudence has been confirmed in the recent Lisbon judgment of the Constitutional 
Court.
138 In this decision, the Court had to decide whether ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon
139 
amending the founding treaties of the European Union and the European Community was 
constitutional with regard to the German Grundgesetz. It held that it was basically possible to 
transfer sovereign power to the EU even if the supranational institutions have the 
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competency to shape politics within certain limits,
140 and to accept the albeit conditional
141 
supremacy of community law.
142 However, the Court demanded to increase the legitimacy 
of EU law-making by strengthening the position of the German parliament in the decision-
making process. In certain areas, which are supposed to belong to the core competencies 
of German statehood, the German representative in the Council, the principal legislative 
organ of the EU, is only allowed to act if he is backed by a formal authorization of the 
German parliament.
143 
The second dimension concerns the constitutional review of community legislation. The 
ECJ argues that European primary law is the exclusive standard of review for community 
acts.
144 The Federal Constitutional Court has generally accepted this stipulation, as long as 
the ECJ guarantees by its jurisprudence that the effectiveness of the human rights 
protection under the EU treaty is comparable to that under the German constitution.
145 
The Court has confirmed this position in later judgments, where it held that two 
applications for constitutional review were inadmissible because the applicant had failed to 
show that the human rights protection by the ECJ lacked effectiveness.
146 
Contrary to the Maastricht decision, the Federal Constitutional Court does not try to derive 
the legitimacy of the ECJ decisions from domestic concepts and institutions, but 
concentrates on the supranational institution itself. In this context, the jurisprudence of the 
Court is thus close to the internationalist paradigm. It adopts a substantive standard of 
legitimacy. The decisive yardstick is the effectiveness of the human rights protection by the 
ECJ. The formal supremacy of the ECJ seems to be acceptable to the German Court 
because there is a considerable amount of material convergence in the human rights 
understanding of both courts so that fundamental conflicts are unlikely.
147 
While these judgments all refer to community law, in the European arrest warrant case, the 
Constitutional Court had to decide on the effect of framework decisions issued under the 
third pillar on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.
148 In this case, the 
German parliament had issued a European Arrest Warrant Act, implementing a framework 
decision of the European Union establishing the European Arrest Warrant
149. The 
Constitutional Court held that the German statute violated two fundamental rights of the 
German Constitution – the right of German citizens not to be extradited and the right to 
judicial review. 
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However, at first glance, the Court did not challenge the supremacy of EU law. It only 
critiqued that the German legislature did not utilize the range of implementation attributed 
by the European decision.
150 If it had done so, there would have been no violation of 
fundamental rights.
151 This reasoning implicitly respects the primacy of the framework 
decision because otherwise it would not have been necessary for the court to examine 
whether there is a range of implementation. It could have fully reviewed the German 
statute without considering the range of determination by the European decision. 
However, upon close reading, we find an unharmonious undertone in an obiter dictum of the 
decision. The Constitutional Court detects a democracy deficit in the third pillar because 
the European Parliament is not actively involved in the legislative process of the Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.
152 The Court resolves this deficit by attributing a 
right to politically redesign the framework decision in the implementation process to the 
national parliaments.
153 According to the Court, they are allowed fully to deny 
implementation, although such a right to denial cannot be found in the text of the treaty. 
This position could be aligned with an internationalist reading, as the Court seems to be 
concerned with the legitimacy of the EU legislative process. However, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht does not engage in a thorough examination of the latter – it only 
makes a brief statement. What really seems to be important to the Court is that the national 
parliament keeps its ability for political structuring in the absence of a significant German 
influence in the supranational decision-making process.  
The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court thus shows traces of both, the 
internationalist and the cooperation perspective. While the Maastricht decision and the case 
on the European Arrest Warrant can best be read in a cooperationist way, the Court seems 
to be willing to give up this position with respect to fundamental rights protection. Here, 
the Federal Constitutional Court does not abstain from any control, but this control only 
refers to the effectiveness of European human rights protection as such. 
The position vis-à-vis international courts outside the European Union 
The situation is different with regard to decisions of international tribunals outside the 
European Union, such as the European Court of Human Rights or the International Court 
of Justice. The German Constitutional Court has pointed out in two recent judgments that 
it does not privilege decisions of international tribunals with the restricted review standard 
of the ‘equal protection’ doctrine that it applies in the context of the European Union. 
Rather, it reserves itself the right to make a full constitutional review. 
In general, the status of international treaties and the effect of decisions of international 
tribunals thereon are not explicitly stated in the German basic law. The Constitutional law 
doctrine in Germany opines that international treaties have no direct effect, but need to be 
transformed into domestic law.
154 However, it is assumed that this transformation is 
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performed by the act that empowers the executive to ratify the treaty.
155 If a treaty thus 
requires parliamentary ratification, then the approval of the treaty by the German 
parliament is considered to be the statute that transforms the treaty into German domestic 
law. The treaty then has the same status in domestic law as the transformatory act, hence 
usually that of a normal statute. It does thus not automatically trump contradicting statutes 
or even constitutional provisions. Rather, any conflict has to be solved according to the 
general rules on norm conflicts, like lex specialis or lex posterior. However, the German 
constitutional court has developed a principle that every statute has to be interpreted in 
accordance with international law as long as there is room for interpretation 
(Völkerrechtsfreundliche Auslegung).
156 
In the Görgülü decision, the Federal Constitutional Court held that decisions of the ECtHR 
were binding on domestic courts, but that this binding effect was not unconditional.
157 The 
applicant in this case was a father, whose son was living with foster parents and who had 
been denied to see his child on a regular basis by the competent Regional Court of Appeal. 
Upon complaint, the ECtHR decided that the decision of the German court was contrary 
to the provisions of the ECHR.
158 However, the Regional Court of Appeal upheld its 
decision and argued that the judgment of the ECtHR had no direct effect in the domestic 
legal order and was thus not binding for the individual courts.
159  
In the constitutional complaint procedure, the Federal Constitutional Court held that 
domestic courts were not bound to apply judgments of the ECtHR unconditionally. It 
argued that domestic courts had to deal with multipolar fundamental rights situation and 
that they were obliged to find a sensitive balance between the competing rights and 
interests. As not all parties to the domestic proceedings were also represented before the 
ECtHR, the judgment of the latter could not be transplanted into the German legal order 
without potential modifications.
160 
However, this does not mean that judgments of the ECtHR are not binding for the 
German courts. Rather, they have to take judgments, which establish a violation of the 
ECHR by Germany, into due consideration.
161 If they want to deviate, they have to justify 
understandably why they do not follow the precedent of the ECtHR. In the case at hand, 
the Constitutional Court found that the Regional Court of Appeal had not taken the 
argumentation of the ECtHR into account and thus violated the rule of law principle of the 
German Constitution.
162 
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In the second decision
163, the effect of the interpretation of treaty provisions by the ICJ 
was at stake. The occasion of the procedure was a decision of the German Federal Court 
of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof),
164 in which the Court had interpreted Art. 36 of the Vienna 
Convention of Consular Relations in a different way than the ICJ in its LaGrand decision
165. 
The applicant in the case before the German constitutional court was a Turkish national 
who had been arrested without having been informed of his right to notify the Turkish 
consular representation about his arrest stemming from Art. 36 (1) lit. b of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations.
166 He was later convicted because of the allegations that 
he had made to the police officer that interviewed him after his arrest. He asked for a 
review of his decision, but the Federal Court of Criminal Justice denied relief because the 
protection of a foreign national was, in his view, sufficiently guaranteed by his right to 
consult an attorney. Against this judgment the applicant filed an application to the 
Constitutional Court, which finally overturned the decision. 
The Court finds that the decision of the Supreme Court had violated the right to a fair 
procedure guaranteed by the German constitution. Because of the principle of international 
law-friendly interpretation, the right to a fair procedure has to be interpreted in light of 
Art.  36 of the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations.
167 In order to avoid future 
determinations by an international tribunal that the Convention has been violated, 
international treaty norms have to be interpreted in accordance with the jurisprudence of 
the competent court even if the judgments are not directly binding for the Federal 
Republic of Germany.
168 As the Supreme Court had not respected the argumentation of the 
International Court of Justice in the LaGrand Case, it had thus violated the right to a fair 
procedure.
169 
However, the Constitutional Court again did not establish an unconditional obligation to 
comply with judgments of international tribunals. Remanding the case to the Federal Court 
of Criminal Justice, it did not order the latter to apply Art. 36 of the Vienna Convention 
without exception. Rather, it demanded to balance the guarantee set forth by the 
Convention against competing principles within the rule of law, such as procedural 
efficiency.
170 The Constitutional Court thus confirms its Görgülü decision by leaving the 
opportunity to deviate from judgments of international courts, in particular if there are 
competing constitutional principles. 
With this reasoning, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht follows the cooperation paradigm.
171 
On the one hand, it acknowledges that decisions of international institutions may have a 
direct effect in the domestic legal order. However, this effect is not unconditional. The 
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Court rather reserves a right to control every individual decision on its compatibility with 
the German constitutional order.
172 This control is, on the other hand, a substantive, not a 
procedural one. The German Court thus wants to remain, at least on the face, in full 
substantive control of the implementation of international decisions into the domestic legal 
order. 
To be sure, the court does not require the German citizens to have an indirect influence in 
the international decision-making procedure as it requires for the case of the European 
Union. This, however, is due to the nature of judicial decisions, which are not subject to 
political participation. The German court tries to balance this perceived deficiency by 
imposing an ex-post-control. Unlike in the case of the US Supreme Court, this ex-post-
control is not exerted by the legislature, but it is the Court itself that controls the 
implementation of the international judgments. 
Evaluation 
Although not being entirely homogenous, the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
basically follows the cooperation paradigm. This is most obvious with regard to the 
implementation of judgments of international tribunals, like the ECtHR or the ICJ. Here, 
the Constitutional Court acknowledges that such decisions may have a direct effect in the 
domestic order. However, they stand under the proviso of a substantive control by the 
German Court. In the context of the European Union, the Court meanders at times 
between the internationalist and the cooperation paradigm. In particular with regard to 
fundamental rights, it basically accepts the jurisprudence of the ECJ, refraining from 
further substantive control. However, this internationalist approach is probably due to the 
special nature of the European Union. Not having accepted the – albeit conditional – 
supremacy the ECJ jurisprudence would have provoked major conflicts and endangered 
the whole integration process.
173 Furthermore, judgments like the Maastricht decision reveal 
the rather cooperationist mind-set of the German Court because the reason for accepting 
the supremacy of EU law is not the legitimacy of the institutional design of the EU as such, 
but is derived from the indirect participation of the German people in the legislative 
process. 
New perspectives on the monism-dualism-dichotomy 
The coordination of different legal systems has become a complex issue that cannot easily 
be integrated into the old monism-dualism-dichotomy.
174 The international legal order has 
moved away from being one monolithic system. Rather, we observe the emergence of a 
certain heteronomy of international tribunals and institutions varying in the extent of their 
competences and the design of their decision-making procedures. The reception of 
decisions of these institutions by national legal orders cannot be subject to a one-fits-all 
approach. Rather, the task of domestic constitutional judges has become more complex. 
When determining the status of international secondary law, judges cannot solely rely on 
formal legal norms, but also have to take political considerations, particularly the legitimacy 
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174  Accord Nijman & Nollkaemper, n 10 above, at 341; Paulus, n 171 above, at 217.   28
of the external legal order, into account. Instead of distinguishing monist from dualist legal 
orders, we should thus rather focus on the strategy a constitutional court chooses in order 
to cope with this challenge. This contribution has identified three different approaches – a 
state sovereignty centered, a cooperation based, and an internationalist perspective. 
This distinction is at odds with the traditional monism-dualism-dichotomy. Even an 
internationalist approach does not imply a monist perspective. Monism would require an 
unconditional acceptance of decisions of international institutions – an approach that was 
followed by the European Court of First Instance in the Kadi and Yusuf decisions.
175 In 
contrast, although qualified as internationalist here, the ECJ is certainly not a monist 
court.
176 But this is precisely the point. Under the traditional distinction, the approaches of 
all three examined courts would be qualified as dualist, although there are significant 
differences between the reasoning of the US Supreme Court and the reasoning of the 
European Court of Justice.
177 It is these differences that the classification proposed in this 
contribution tries to capture. 
How do we explain the differences in the national jurisprudence? A positivist will be 
inclined to trace them back to the different texts of the relevant constitutional provisions. 
But neither the German constitution nor the EC treaty tell us very much about the 
domestic effect of international treaties. And an unprejudiced glance at Art. VI para. 2 of 
the American constitution would probably have suggested a much more internationalist 
position than the one developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Medellín. Furthermore, a 
positivist perspective cannot explain why certain courts are not uniform in treating 
international decisions. The ECJ, e.g., readily accepts the conditional supremacy of 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the interpretation of 
human rights. On the other hand, it challenged the applicability of a UN Security Council 
resolution in the Kadi case. 
The explanation, therefore, has to be a different one. In particular, one reason is worth to 
be explored. The variation in the jurisprudence can be due to a different level of trust into 
international institutions.
178 The more the international decision-making procedures 
embrace the rule of law, the more the trust in these procedures will be enhanced. Formal 
guarantees are not everything, though. The performance of a decision-making procedure 
equally depends on the mind-set of the actors operating within this procedure.
179 The 
extent to which a constitutional court places trust in the actors involved in international 
procedures also depends on the own cultural predetermination.
180 Judges with an 
international perspective and a greater exposure to international cooperation will probably 
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put more trust into international decision-making procedures than judges coming from a 
more isolationist tradition. 
However, different conceptions of legitimacy cannot fully explain the positions of 
constitutional courts that we observe. In some cases, strategic considerations and the 
exigencies of the political framework play a crucial role. On the one hand, they may be one 
of the reasons why courts adopt a certain conception of legitimacy. This would, e.g., 
explain why the German Constitutional Court adopts a different attitude towards the 
human rights jurisprudence of the ECJ than towards judgments of the ECtHR or the ICJ. 
The United States, in contrast, are not involved in a dense network of international 
integration so that the US Supreme Court can take a more reserved perspective with regard 
to the implementation of international law.
181 On the other hand, strategic concerns may, at 
times, even override legitimacy considerations. This can best be observed at the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ vis-à-vis the direct effect of decisions of the WTO Appellate 
Body. Here, the reasoning of the court is clearly framed in strategic terms without paying 
much attention to the legitimacy of the WTO system. 
Both of these factors are probably contributing to the development that we observe in the 
field of coordinating international and domestic law. From both perspectives, it is no 
surprise that the ECJ, which is a hybrid body somewhere in between a constitutional court 
and an international tribunal itself, takes the most internationalist stance of the three 
examined courts. But even the internationalist perspective does not require an 
unconditional supremacy of international law. This is expressed by the Kadi judgment, 
where the Court dismissed a U.N. sanctions system that does not even come close to 
resembling a procedure guided by the rule of law. The ECJ followed a prudent strategy 
addressing signals to two different kinds of actors. With regard to the international system, 
it did not close the door, but entered into an institutional dialogue by leaving open the 
opportunity of accepting a revised sanctioning system in the future.
182 Concerning the 
Constitutional courts of the EU member states, the ECJ took one important step in order 
to strengthen their trust in its adherence to fundamental rights and the rule of law.
183 
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